Growth, unemployment and wage inertia [WP] by Raurich, Xavier & Sorolla, Valeri
 Growth, unemployment and wage inertia 
 
 
 
Xavier Raurich 
Valeri Sorolla 
 
Col.lecció d’Economia E14/309  
 
 UB Economics Working Papers 2014/309 
 
Growth, unemployment and wage inertia 
 
 
Abstract: We introduce wage setting via efficiency wages in the neoclassical 
one-sector growth model to study the growth effects of wage inertia. We compare 
the dynamic equilibrium of an economy with wage inertia with the equilibrium of 
an economy without it. We show that wage inertia affects the long run 
employment rate and that the transitional dynamics of the main economic 
variables will be different because wages are a state variable when wage inertia 
is introduced. In particular, we show that the model with wage inertia can explain 
some growth patterns that cannot be explained when wages are flexible. We also 
study the growth effects of permanent technological and fiscal policy shocks in 
these two economies. During the transition, the growth effects of technological 
shocks obtained when wages exhibit inertia may be the opposite of those 
obtained when wages are flexible. These technological shocks may have long 
run effects if there is wage inertia. 
 
 
 
JEL Codes: O41. 
 
Keywords: Wage inertia, Growth, Efficiency wages, Transitional dynamics, 
Unemployment.  
 
 
Xavier Raurich 
Facultat d'Economia i Empresa 
Universitat de Barcelona 
 
Valeri Sorolla 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements: Raurich and Sorolla gratefully acknowledge financial support 
from the Ministry of Science and Innovation through grants ECO2009-06953 and 
ECO2009-09847; and from the Generalitat de Catalunya through grants 2009SGR-
1051, 2009SGR-578 and the Barcelona GSE Research Network. The paper has also 
benefited from comments by David de la Croix, Victor Montuenga, Fernando Sanchez-
Losada and seminar participants at the Academia Sinica, University of Milan and 
University of Vigo. 
 
 
 
. 
ISSN 1136-8365 
1 Introduction
Wage inertia implies that current wages depend on past wages.1 This relationship is a
well-known empirical fact in labor economics (see Bell, 1996; Blanchard and Katz, 1997
and the survey by Montuenga-Gómez and Ramos-Parreño, 2005). Moreover, wage inertia
has been justied in di¤erent wage settings. In models of wage bargaining between unions
and rms, the wage is set as a markup over a reference wage that is interpreted as a fall
back position. This reference wage is typically related to the unemployment benet,
which, in most OECD countries depends on past wages. This introduces the relationship
between current and past wages (Burkhard and Morgenstern, 2000 and Beissinger and
Egger, 2004). Wage inertia has also been justied in e¢ ciency wage models, where the
wage is set by the rm in order to induce workers to exert the prot maximizing amount
of e¤ort (de la Croix and Collard, 2000; Danthine and Donaldson, 1990, and Danthine
and Kurmann, 2004). In this wage setting, the wage also depends on a reference wage
if fairness is introduced in workersdisutility of e¤ort. This reference wage is frequently
interpreted as a social norm that depends on past wages. In this way, wage inertia
is introduced in the e¢ ciency wage model.2 This second approach has some empirical
support from survey evidence (Bewley, 2002).
Wage inertia introduces a process of wage adjustment that drives the transitional
dynamics of wages and modies the time path of the other variables in the economy,
including the GDP growth rate. These di¤erences in the transitional dynamics have been
explored in New Keynesian models, where there is also price inertia, to explain facts of
the business cycle and the e¤ects of monetary shocks (Danthine and Kurmann, 2004; and
Blanchard and Galí, 2007). However, wage inertia has not been introduced in growth
models to explain facts of the growth process.3 Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to
study how wage inertia modies the time path of the GDP growth rate, and to show that
a simple version of the neoclassical growth model with wage inertia can explain two facts
of the growth process that could not be explained if wages were exible. First, we explain
the high growth rates that some emerging economies have exhibited over long periods
1The literature also refers to wage inertia as persistence or sluggishness.
2In e¢ ciency wage models, wages are typically exible. By exible wages we mean that there is no
wage inertia and, thus, current wages do not depend on past wages. However, it does not mean that this
exible wage clears the labor market and, hence, there is full employment. The assumption of a reference
wage that depends on past wages is then crucial to introduce wage inertia.
3Growth models with wage bargaining between rms and unions and non frictional unemployment have
been studied by Benassy (1997), Daveri and Tabellini (2000), Braüninger (2000), Daveri and Mafezzoli
(2000), Doménech and García (2008) and growth models with e¢ ciency wages have been studied by
Van Shaik and de Groot (1998), Alexopoulos (2003), Mekl (2004), Nakajima (2006), Brecher, Chen and
Choudhri (2002) and Pierpaolo (2010). In all these papers, wages do not exhibit inertia. Two exceptions
that introduce wage inertia in a growth model are the papers by Raurich, Sala and Sorolla (2006) and
Greiner and Flaschel (2010). However, these two papers only study the long run growth e¤ects of the
interaction between wage inertia and some particular scal policies.
2
of time.4 According to King and Rebelo (1993) the neoclassical growth model requires
implausibly high interest rates to explain these large growth rates. We show that taking
into account labor market dynamics driven by wage inertia may explain high growth rates
with plausible values of the interest rate.
Second, Easterly (1991), Christiano (1989) and, more recently, Steger (2001),
Papageorgiou and Perez-Sebastian (2005) and Jeong and Yong Kim (2006, 2008) show
that some fast growing economies exhibit a hump-shaped transition of the GDP growth
rate. The neoclassical growth model implies a monotonic transition and thus it cannot
explain this fact. We show that a version of this model that introduces wage inertia can
explain these hump-shaped transitions.
We analyze a version of the neoclassical one-sector exogenous growth model with
e¢ ciency wages. In the model, wages are set by rms in order to make workers exert
an amount of e¤ort that maximizes prots. These non-walrasian wages cause non-
frictional unemployment. We assume that the workersdisutility of e¤ort depends on
the comparison between current wages and a reference wage. Therefore, the amount of
e¤ort exerted by workers will depend on this comparison and, as a consequence, wages
will be set by the rms in relation to this reference wage. Until Section 5, the reference
wage is external to the individuals and it is interpreted as a social norm that depends on
past average labor income. It follows that current wages depend on past wages, implying
that wage inertia is introduced and that wages are a state variable. Therefore, in this
version of the neoclassical growth model, two forces drive the transition: rst, as in the
neoclassical growth model with full employment, the diminishing returns to capital; and
second, the process of wage adjustment.
We distinguish between two e¤ects of wage inertia. On the one hand, the time
path of the employment rate depends on both capital accumulation and the process of
wage adjustment. Capital accumulation increases labor demand and, thus, increases
employment. Wage growth reduces employment. Thus, a fast (slow) accumulation of
capital in comparison to the speed of wage adjustment will imply an increase (decrease)
in the employment rate. Therefore, the interaction between capital accumulation and
wage adjustment can explain periods of fast employment creation and also non-monotonic
transitions of the employment rate that are not present when wages are exible.
On the other hand, the returns on capital and wages are related because we assume
perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Then, wage inertia modies the time
path of capital accumulation because it changes the returns on capital. In particular, if
wages are initially high then the interest rate will initially be low, implying low capital
accumulation. The opposite holds when wages are initially low. Moreover, a process of
4Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore had annual growth rates of more than 6% during the period
1960-2000.
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fast wage adjustment also causes fast changes in capital accumulation.
During the transition, the GDP growth rate depends on the exogenous growth rate
of technology, capital accumulation and the growth rates of both employment and
e¤ort. The particular assumptions of the model regarding the disutility of e¤ort and the
reference wage imply a constant optimal amount of e¤ort during the transition. Therefore,
wage inertia modies the GDP growth rate by changing both capital accumulation and
employment growth. These changes modify the time path of the GDP growth rate,
which may exhibit non-monotonic transitions. In Section 4, we compare this transitional
dynamics with the one obtained in a version of the neoclassical growth model with exible
wages. In this case, increases in productivity, due to either capital accumulation or
exogenous productivity shocks, translate completely into wage increases and do not a¤ect
the employment rate, which is constant. Then, as in the neoclassical model with full
employment, the GDP growth rate only depends on capital accumulation, and therefore
transitional dynamics will exhibit a monotonic behavior.
In Section 4, we use numerical simulations to study the e¤ects of wage inertia during
the transition. First, we show that in economies with an initial high wage, the employment
rate is initially low and increasing. As a consequence, in these economies, the growth rate
of GDP will initially be large and then decrease during the transition. In contrast, initial
low wages imply that the employment rate will initially be high and then decrease during
the transition. This implies that the growth rate of GDP will initially be low and will
increase during the transition. We conclude that economies with the same initial stock of
capital may exhibit di¤erent time paths of the growth rate of GDP if their initial wages
are di¤erent. This suggests that the introduction of initial wages in the empirical analysis
of convergence may improve the estimations t.
We also show that wage inertia can generate a process of fast employment creation that
may cause both a hump-shaped transition of the GDP growth rate and high GDP growth
rates. Before this process starts, GDP growth will be low. Then, during the process of
employment growth, the GDP growth rate will be high due to the increasing employment
rate. Finally, when the creation of employment ends, the GDP growth rate decreases
until it converges to its long run value. Moreover, during the period of employment
creation, the GDP growth rates are very high even when the interest rates take plausible
values. As mentioned, there is evidence that some emerging economies have exhibited
these transitions in recent decades. We conclude that the introduction of wage inertia
may contribute to explain some facts of the growth process.
In the second part of Section 4, we compare the growth e¤ects of technological shocks
in the model with exible wages and in the model with wage inertia. We consider two
di¤erent technological shocks: a permanent increase in the level of total factor productivity
(TFP) and a permanent increase in the growth rate of TFP. While the second shock
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causes permanent e¤ects on the employment rate and the growth rate, the rst shock
has only transitional e¤ects on the GDP growth rate. However, these transitional e¤ects
will depend on the intensity of wage inertia. When wages are exible, employment does
not change and transitional dynamics are driven only by diminishing returns to capital.
In this case, the shock initially increases the marginal product of capital, and therefore
the GDP growth rate increases. When there is wage inertia, this shock implies an initial
increase in the employment rate and a decrease in this variable during the transition.
This causes a negative e¤ect on GDP growth that is not present when wages are exible.
This negative growth e¤ect dominates the positive growth e¤ect associated to capital
accumulation during the rst periods and, therefore, this shock initially reduces the GDP
growth rate. Thus, the e¤ects on the GDP growth rate of a permanent increase in the
level of TFP depend on the intensity of wage inertia.5
The second shock, the permanent increase in the growth rate of TFP, implies a faster
growth of the marginal product of labor. Flexible wages adjust immediately to this faster
growth of the marginal product, implying that the employment rate does not change. In
contrast, when there is wage inertia, wages do not adjust to this faster growth of the
marginal product. As a consequence, when there is wage inertia, this technological shock
causes an increase in the employment rate both during the transition and in the long
run. Therefore, wage inertia introduces a positive relationship between the exogenous
long run growth rate and the long run employment rate that is supported by empirical
evidence.6 Note that, by interpreting the productivity growth slowdown in the 1970s as
a reduction in the TFP growth rate, this positive relationship explains the persistently
high unemployment rates in Europe.
Finally, we study the growth e¤ects of the introduction of an unemployment benet.
This unemployment benet raises the reference wage and, therefore, wages increase. If
wages are exible, they immediately adjust, implying an immediate jump downwards in
both employment and GDP. When there is wage inertia, wages do not immediately adjust
to this scal policy and, therefore, the employment rate and the level of GDP will su¤er
a slow decline. Thus, the macroeconomic e¤ects of this scal policy su¤er a delay when
wages exhibit inertia.
Section 5 studies the robustness of the conclusions obtained in Section 4 when the
reference wage is internal instead of external. This internal reference wage is interpreted
as a personal norm that depends on the workerspast labor income. In this case, rms
must take into account that an increase in current wages raises the future reference wage
5Basu et. al. (2006) provides evidence that technological improvements can be contractionary.
6As mentioned in Benigno, Ricci and Surico (2011), many authors show time series and cross-country
evidence in favor of a negative relationship between unemployment and productivity growth at low
frequencies. In fact, these authors nd a similar result in a model with downward wage rigidity and
without capital.
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and thus reduces e¤ort in the future. Therefore, the prot maximization problem of the
rms is dynamic and implies a non constant optimal time path of e¤ort. This non-constant
time path directly a¤ects the GDP growth rate during the transition. However, using the
numerical examples of Section 4, we show that the main conclusions regarding the growth
e¤ects of wage inertia hold when the reference wage is internal.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 denes
the equilibrium. Section 4 develops the numerical analysis that is used to study the
transitional dynamics when there is wage inertia. Section 5 studies the transition in the
internal reference wage model. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
2 The economy
In this section we rst describe the problem of the consumers; we then introduce the
technology and the optimal decisions of the rms, and, nally, we specify a wage setting
rule with wage inertia.
2.1 Consumers
Consider an economy populated by Nt ex ante identical innitely lived consumers. Each
consumer chooses consumption, Ct, and e¤ort, e
f
t ; in order to maximize the discounted
sum of the utility
1Z
t=0
e ( n)t
h
u (Ct)  dtvt

eft
i
dt;
where  > 0 is the subjective discount rate, n  0 is the constant population growth
rate, dt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the consumer is employed and equals 0 if he
is unemployed. The utility function is separable in consumption and e¤ort. We assume
that u (Ct) is a twice continuously di¤erentiable utility function, increasing and concave,
which satises the Inada conditions. Following Akerlof (1982), we introduce fairness in
the disutility of e¤ort. In particular, we assume the following functional form:
vt

eft

=

eft   ln

(1  )wtewst
2
;
where  is the labor income tax rate, wt is the wage, wst is an external reference wage ande > 0 is a preference parameter. Note that the consumersdisutility of e¤ort decreases if
they feel that they are well paid, which happens when the wage net of taxes is larger than
the reference wage. Obviously, the disutility increases when consumers do not consider
that they are well paid.
There is no consensus in the literature on the determinants of the reference wage.
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Layard et al. (1991, chapter 2) identies it with the average labor income. Blanchard
and Katz (1999) and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) assume that the reference wage also
depends on past wages. Using survey data, Bewley (2002) provides evidence on the
relation between the reference wage and past wages. We follow these authors and we
interpret the reference wage as a social norm that depends on the average past labor
income in the economy. As a consequence, it is external to the individual. This assumption
is crucial as it implies that rms do not consider that their decisions today can modify the
current or future value of the reference wage. In Section 5 we also study the equilibrium
when the reference wage is internal because it is interpreted as a personal norm that
depends on the workers own past labor income.
In each period t a fraction of the consumers will be unemployed. As a consequence,
there is ex post heterogeneity. To avoid the complexity associated with ex post
heterogeneity, we follow Collard and de la Croix (2000) and introduce unemployment
insurance contracts which are not a¤ected by transaction costs and are o¤ered by risk
neutral insurance companies. Thus, risk averse consumers choose complete insurance
against the risk of being unemployed. This means that the income of employed and
unemployed consumers will coincide, implying that consumers are ex post identical.7 If
consumers are employed, they obtain
Iet = (1  )wt  mt;
where mt is the cost of unemployment insurance. If consumers are unemployed, they
obtain
Iut = bt +
mt
1  lt  mt;
where bt is the unemployment benet, mt /(1  lt) is the unemployment insurance and lt
is the employment rate, which is dened as the ratio between the number of employed
workers and the total labor force. The labor income of both employed and unemployed
workers coincides when the cost of the insurance is
mt = [(1  )wt   bt] (1  lt):
7Collard and de la Croix (2000) show that this contract exists.
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In this case, Iet = I
u
t = It; where It is the average labor income and it is dened as
8
It = (1  )wtlt + bt(1  lt):
Therefore, the budget constraint of the representative consumer is
_St = rtSt + It + Tt   Ct; (1)
where St is the stock of assets, It is the labor income and Tt is a lump-sum subsidy.
The consumer decides optimally on e¤ort, consumption and investment by maximizing
the discounted sum of utilities subject to the budget constraint. The solution of the
maximization problem of the consumers is characterized by the e¤ort function
eft = ln [(1  )wt]  ln (ewst ) ; (2)
the Euler condition
_Ct
Ct
=
rt   
 (Ct)
, (3)
where  (Ct) =  u00 (Ct)Ct /u0 (Ct) ; the budget constraint, and the following
transversality condition:
lim
t !1
e tu0 (Ct)St = 0: (4)
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of rms distributed in the interval [0; 1] : These rms produce using
the following neoclassical production function:
Yt = F (Kt; e
f
tAtLt),
where Yt is gross domestic product (GDP), Kt is capital, e
f
t is e¤ort, At is technology and
eftAtLt are e¢ ciency units of employed labor. We assume that technology, At; exogenously
increases at a constant growth rate x  0; and that the production function satises the
following properties: constant returns to scale, twice continuously di¤erentiable, F1 > 0,
F2 > 0, F11 < 0, F22 < 0 and the Inada conditions.9 Note that e¤ort increases the
productivity of labor. This is taken into account by rms that set wage contracts as a
8Expost heterogeneity associated to unemployment can also be avoided by assuming that all members
of the economy belong to the same big family. Daveri and Ma¤ezzoli (2000), Doménech and García (2008),
Eriksson (1997) follow this big family assumption. If instead of a big family we have heterogeneous
agents, the solution would not change as long as we assume complete competitive insurance markets for
unemployment or if we assume that a union pursues a redistributive goal, acting as a substitute for the
insurance markets (Ma¤ezzoli, 2001 and Benassy, 1997).
9We dene F1 = @F /@K , and F2 = @F
.
@

eftAtLt

:
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partial gift exchange: in exchange for higher salaries, workers will exert a higher amount
of e¤ort. Obviously, these non-walrasian wages will create unemployment in this model.
Firms take into account the e¤ort function when they maximize prots,
F (Kt; e
f
tAtLt)  wtLt   (rt + )Kt; where rt is the interest rate and  2 (0; 1) is the
constant depreciation rate. The rst order conditions with respect to capital, labor and
wages imply
rt = F1   ; (5)
wt = e
f
tAtFL; (6)
and
@eft
@wt
wt
eft
= 1: (7)
The third equation is the Solow condition. From combining the e¤ort function and
the Solow condition, we obtain that eft = 1 is the amount of e¤ort that maximizes prots.
Therefore, this optimal amount of e¤ort of employed workers is constant through the
transition. As shown by de la Croix, de Walque and Wouters (2009) the optimal amount
of e¤ort is constant because the e¤ort function assumed is log-linear. Using this constant
e¤ort level and the constant returns to scale assumption, (6) can be rewritten as
bwt = f bkt  bktf 0 bkt ; (8)
where bwt = wt /At is the wage per e¢ ciency units of labor, bkt = Kt /AtLt is capital per
e¢ ciency units of employed labor, and the production function in intensive form satises
the following properties: f 0 > 0 and f 00 < 0. Using (8), we obtain
bkt = ~k( bwt), (9)
where ~k0 > 0 and from (9) we obtain the labor demand function
Ldt =
Kt
At~k( bwt) . (10)
Combining (5) and (9), we obtain the zero prot condition as a function relating the
interest rate and wages
rt = f
0
h
~k ( bwt)i    er ( bwt) ; (11)
where er0 < 0: Thus, if wages increase faster than e¢ ciency units of labor, the interest rate
decreases in order to have zero prots.
We assume that the labor supply is exogenous and equal to population, Nt: Population
grows at a constant rate n.10 Using the labor supply, we dene GDP per e¢ ciency units
10Conclusions regarding the growth e¤ects of wage inertia would not be modied if an endogenous
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of labor (population) yt = Yt /AtNt , capital per e¢ ciency units of labor (population)
kt = Kt /AtNt and the employment rate lt = Lt /Nt 2 [0; 1]. Moreover, we use the
constant returns to scale assumption to rewrite the production function as follows
yt = g(kt; lt).
In models with wage setting, factor markets do not clear if the wage is di¤erent from
the competitive walrasian wage. When the wage is lower than the walrasian wage, there
is excess supply in the capital market and excess demand in the labor market; and if the
wage is higher than the walrasian wage then there is excess demand in the capital market
and excess supply in the labor market. In this paper, we will consider the latter case,
which implies that the equilibrium stock of capital is determined by the supply and the
equilibrium level of employment is determined by the labor demand, that is
Lt =
Kt
At~k( bwt) . (12)
Using (12), we obtain the employment rate function
lt = el( bwt; kt) = kt~k( bwt) . (13)
Note that the employment rate increases with the capital stock and decreases with the
wages per e¢ ciency unit. Finally, we use (13) to rewrite the ratio of GDP to capital as
the following decreasing function of wages:
yt
kt
= g(1;
1
~k( bwt)) = h
h
~k ( bwt)i , h0 < 0: (14)
2.3 Wage setting rule with inertia
We rst summarize the decisions of consumers and rms to obtain two well-known
equations that make explicit the crucial role of wages in this model. To this end, we
dene ct = Ct /At as consumption per e¢ ciency units of labor, we use the equilibrium
condition of the capital market, St = Atkt; and we assume that the government budget
constraint is balanced in each period and equal to
Ltwt = NtTt + (Nt   Lt)bt:
Note that tax revenues are returned to the consumers either as a lump-sum transfer or as
unemployment benet. Therefore, labor income taxes do not cause wealth e¤ects in this
labor supply had been assumed and leisure had been introduced additively in the utility function.
10
economy.
Using equations (1), (3), (8), (11) and (14), the equilibrium condition in the capital
market and the government budget constraint, we obtain
_ct
ct
=
f 0
h
~k ( bwt)i        (ctAt)x
 (ctAt)
, (15)
and
_kt
kt
= h
h
~k ( bwt)i  ct
kt
  (n+ x+ ) . (16)
Equations (15) and (16) characterize the growth rates of consumption and capital
per e¢ ciency units of labor. These equations depend on the time path of the wage per
e¢ ciency unit of labor. On the one hand, a higher wage reduces the interest rate and
causes a substitution e¤ect that deters future capital accumulation. On the other hand,
higher wages reduce the employment rate and, therefore, cause a negative wealth e¤ect
that reduces the rate of growth of capital. We conclude that the transitional dynamics of
the one-sector growth model will depend on the particular assumptions regarding wage
setting. We can distinguish three di¤erent wage settings.
First, if wages are exible and are set in order to clear the markets, there is full
employment, implying that lt = 1 and that ~k ( bwt) = kt: In this case, equations (15) and
(16) characterize the dynamic equilibrium of the standard neoclassical growth model with
full employment.
Second, if wages are exible but are set above the competitive wage, markets do not
clear and lt < 1: In this case, ~k ( bwt) = kt /lt ; where lt = el( bwt; kt) is dened in (13).
Obviously, the system of di¤erential equations (15) and (16) alone does not characterize
the dynamic equilibrium. The equilibrium will also depend on the wage equation, which
is obtained from the wage setting and determines the wage. The growth literature that
studies the joint dynamics of growth and unemployment has considered this framework
of non-walrasian wages without inertia. In this framework of exible wages, the wage
equation is static, implying that the equilibrium employment rate is either a function of
capital or, under appropriate assumptions regarding the wage setting, constant during the
transition. In the latter case, the transitional dynamics are identical to the ones obtained
in the standard version of the neoclassical growth model with full employment.
Finally, if wages exhibit inertia, there is an additional dynamic equation that governs
wage dynamics. In this paper we show that the transitional dynamics in this case are
di¤erent from the ones obtained when wages do not exhibit inertia, and we outline that
these di¤erences can explain some facts of the growth process. We proceed to obtain the
wage equation.
In the e¢ ciency wage model considered in this paper, wages are set by the rm so
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that workers exert the optimal amount of e¤ort, eft = 1: Using the e¤ort function (2), it
follows that wages set by the rm satisfy
wt =
wst
1   ; (17)
where  = ee  1: Note that a higher value of  implies that rms must pay a higher
wage in order to obtain the same amount of e¤ort. Regarding the reference wage, in this
paper we follow de la Croix and Collard (2000) and Raurich, et al. (2006) and assume
that the reference wage is a social norm that is dened as the following weighted average
of past average labor income:
wst = w
s
0e
  t + 
Z t
0
e (t i)I (i) di; (18)
where ws0 is the initial value of the reference wage,  > 0 provides a measure of the wage
adjustment rate and It is the workersaverage labor income
It = (1  ) ltwt + (1  lt) bt; (19)
with the unemployment benets being bt =  (1  )wt and  2 (0; 1).
Note that a larger value of  reduces the weights given to the past wages and thus
implies a lower wage inertia. Therefore,  provides a very convenient parametrization
of the speed of wage adjustment. Moreover, if  diverges to innite, the reference wage
coincides with the current average labor income and, in this limiting case, there is no wage
inertia. Therefore, we must distinguish between the limiting case in which  diverges to
innite and the case in which  takes a nite value.
If  diverges to innite, (18) simplies as follows: wst = It: We solve the system of
equations (17), (19) and wst = It to obtain that when wages do not exhibit inertia the
employment rate is constant and equal to
lt = 1 +
1  
 (1  )  l: (20)
An increase in the parameter  raises wages and thus reduces the employment rate. We
will assume that  2 [1; 1 /) in order that l 2 (0; 1]. Note that there is full employment
when  = 1; whereas there is unemployment when  > 1: Note also that the employment
rate does not depend on the growth rate of the economy: in other words, it does not depend
on capital accumulation or on technological progress. This result is a consequence of the
fact that the increase in wages crowds out completely the positive e¤ect on employment of
capital accumulation or technological progress when wages are exible. In the following
section, we show that this complete crowding out does not arise when wages exhibit
12
inertia.
If  takes a nite value, wages exhibit inertia, implying that there is a process of wage
adjustment. To characterize this process, we rst obtain the law of motion of the reference
wage by di¤erentiating (18) with respect to time
_wst =  [It   wst ] : (21)
Combining (17), (19) and (21), we obtain
_wst
wst
=  [ (1  ) lt +   1] :
We log-di¤erentiate (17) and bwt = wt /At and substitute the expression of the growth
rate of the reference wage to obtain the growth rate of wages per e¢ ciency unit of labor
bwtbwt =  [ (1  ) lt +   1]  x: (22)
Equation (22) is the dynamic wage equation of this model and it drives convergence in
the labor market. To see this, assume that the employment rate is initially high. As
a consequence, the average labor income is initially high, implying that the reference
wage and wages will be higher in the future. As follows from (22), the growth of wages
will initially be high in this case. The fast growth of wages causes a reduction in the
employment rate. This reduction deters wage growth and makes wages per e¢ ciency unit
and employment converge to their long run value.
3 Equilibrium
We must distinguish between the equilibrium when  diverges to innite and wages are
exible and the equilibrium when wages exhibit inertia because  takes a nite value.
Denition 1 Given the initial condition k0; an equilibrium with exible wages is a path
fct; kt; bwt; ltg that solves the system of di¤erential equations (15) and (16), and satises
(20), (13) and the transversality condition (4).
Denition 2 Given the initial conditions k0 and w0; an equilibrium with wage inertia is
a path fct; kt; bwt; ltg that solves the system of di¤erential equations (15), (16), and (22),
and satises (13) and the transversality condition (4).
Note that the main di¤erence between these two equilibrium denitions is the number
of state variables. The equilibrium with exible wages is characterized by one control
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variable, ct; and one state variable, kt: The transition of this equilibrium is qualitatively
equivalent to the transition in the neoclassical growth model with full employment because
the employment rate remains constant. In fact, the model is the neoclassical growth model
with full employment (the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model) when  = 1: Therefore, as in
the growth model with full employment, if the initial level of capital is smaller (larger)
than its long run level then the rate of growth of GDP is initially larger (smaller) than
the long run growth rate; x; and decreases (increases) monotonically until convergence.
We show that this transition is very di¤erent when wage inertia is introduced.
In order to simplify the analysis and obtain results, we assume the following isoelastic
utility function:
u (Ct) =
C1 t   1
1   (23)
and the following Cobb-Douglas production function:11
Yt = K

t

eftAtLt
1 
;  2 (0; 1) : (24)
Proposition 3 There is a unique steady state equilibrium. The steady state values of the
employment rate and of wages, capital, consumption and GDP per e¢ ciency unit satisfy
l = 1 +
1  
(1  )  +
x
(1  )  ;
bw = (1  ) + + x

 
 1
;
k =

 + + x

 1
 1
l;
c
k
=
 + + x

  (n+ x+ ) ;
y
k
=
 + + x

:
Note that the long run values of the ratios y /k and c /k and the wage bw do not depend
on the parameters characterizing the labor market. Thus, the equilibrium of the one-sector
growth model converges to the same values of these variables regardless of the wage setting
assumed. However, the long run values of the employment rate and the levels of capital,
GDP and consumption per e¢ ciency units of population depend on both  and : On the
one hand, a larger value of  causes a reduction in the employment rate. This reduction
implies a decrease in the levels of capital, consumption, and GDP. On the other hand, the
employment rate increases with x only if  takes a nite value. The parameter x measures
the long run growth rate of per capita GDP. Therefore, wage inertia introduces a positive
11In Appendix A we obtain the expressions of the di¤erential equations characterizing the equilibrium
when the utility function is (23) and the production function is (24).
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relationship between the long run values of the growth rate and of the employment rate
that is not present when wages are exible. The intuition is as follows. Sustained growth
implies that the labor demand increases at the growth rate x. Wage inertia prevents
wages from increasing with the labor demand, which explains the positive e¤ect on the
employment rate. The same intuition explains that the employment rate decreases with
the speed of wage adjustment, ; when there is sustained growth. This result contributes
to the literature that analyzes the long run relationship between growth and employment
in di¤erent wage settings and in di¤erent growth models. This literature has proposed
di¤erent mechanisms explaining a positive (or negative) relationship between these two
variables. In this paper, we show that wage inertia is another mechanism relating growth
with employment in the long run.
Proposition 4 The steady state equilibrium of the economy with wage inertia is locally
saddle path stable.
This result shows that there is a unique dynamic equilibrium. In the following
section we show how wage inertia a¤ects the transitional dynamics along this unique
equilibrium.12
4 Numerical analysis
When wages are exible, transitional dynamics are governed by the diminishing returns
to capital and, thus, they only depend on the initial value of capital per e¢ ciency units
of labor. In contrast, when there is wage inertia, transitional dynamics are governed by
both the diminishing returns to capital and wage dynamics. In this case, transitional
dynamics will depend on the initial conditions on both capital and wages per e¢ ciency
units of labor. The existence of two di¤erent forces driving the transition implies that the
dynamic equilibrium will exhibit relevant di¤erences with respect to the equilibrium path
of a model with exible wages. In this section, we compare these di¤erent transitional
dynamics by means of a numerical analysis. Therefore, the value of the parameters must
be xed.
We assume that  = 2; which implies a value of the IES = 0:5; and  = 0:35;
which implies a constant value of the labor income share equal to 65%. We x x = 2%
and n = 1%; which are within the range of empirically plausible values of these two
12Given that we have a two dimensional manifold, there are two roots with a negative real part. In
the numerical example of the following section, the roots are complex numbers when  is su¢ ciently low.
This implies that for a su¢ ciently high intensity of wage inertia the equilibrium exhibits oscillations.
In the examples in the following section, we assume a value of  such that the roots are real numbers.
Therefore, the non-monotonic behavior of the variables will just be a consequence of the existence of two
di¤erent forces driving the transition.
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parameters. The depreciation rate  = 6:46% implies a long run net interest rate equal to
5:2% and the subjective discount rate  = 0:012 implies that the long run ratio of capital
to GDP equals 3. Given these values of the parameters, a period must be interpreted as
a year. We assume that there is no unemployment benet in the benchmark economy,
 = 0; and the value of  is set so that the long run employment rate equals l = 0:9: As 
is used to calibrate the long run value of the employment rate, this parameter will take a
di¤erent value in the economy with exible wages and in the economy with wage inertia:
specically,  = 1:22 in the economy with wage inertia and  = 1:11 in the economy with
exible wages. Finally, the parameter  determines the speed of wage adjustment.13 We
set the value of  equal to 0:2; which implies that half distance in wages is satised in
only three periods.14
In what follows, we show the results of several selected numerical exercises. In the
numerical examples we use the relaxation algorithm proposed by Trimborn, Koch and
Steger (2008) to obtain the transition in a two-dimensional stable manifold. The purpose
of the exercises in Subsection 4.1 is to show that the model with wage inertia can explain
some growth facts that the neoclassical growth model with exible wages cannot explain.
The exercises in Subsection 4.2 compare the growth e¤ects of shocks in an economy with
exible wages and in an economy with wage inertia.
4.1 Transitional dynamics
In a rst numerical exercise, Figure 1 compares the transitional dynamics of two economies
with the same initial capital stock, which is 5% smaller than the long run capital stock,
and a di¤erent initial wage. The economy described by the continuous line has an initial
wage that is 5% lower than the long run wage and the economy illustrated by the dashed
line has an initial wage that is 5% higher than its long run value. Without wage inertia,
this initially small capital stock will imply a growth rate of GDP larger than 2% and
monotonically decreasing towards its long run value. Therefore, this numerical exercise is
aimed to show how wage inertia and the initial conditions on wages modify this transitional
dynamics. The rst two panels show the time path of the two state variables: wages and
capital per e¢ ciency units. The third panel shows the time path of the interest rate,
which follows from (11). This equation implies a negative relationship between wages
per e¢ ciency units of labor and the interest rate over the growth process. Panel (iv)
displays the time path of the employment rate. Equation (13) shows that the path of
13The value of  could be calibrated using the autoregressive coe¢ cient in the estimated wage equations.
However, there is no consensus on the value of this coe¢ cient in the empirical labor literature (see
Montuenga and Ramos-Parreño, 2005). The value of the parameter  used in the simulation exercises
would imply a conservative value of the autoregressive coe¢ cient equal to 0:82.
14Half distance is dened as bw  bw0bw  bw0 = 12 ; where  is the number of periods needed to satisfy half
distance.
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the employment rate is completely determined by the path of capital and wages per
e¢ ciency units of labor. As capital accumulates, labor demand increases and so does the
employment rate. However, an increase in wages reduces the employment rate. Thus, the
two forces driving the transition have opposite e¤ects on employment, which may cause
a non-monotonic behavior in the time path of this variable (see panel iv).
Panels v) and vi) display, respectively, the time path of the growth rate of per capita
GDP and the logarithm of per capita GDP. We use the production function to obtain the
logarithm of per capita GDP as the following function:
lnGDP = a+  ln k + (1  ) ln l + xt;
where a is a constant. In the long run, the logarithm of GDP is a linear function of
time implying a constant long run growth rate equal to x: However, during the transition,
both the accumulation of capital and the growth of the employment rate determine the
time path of the GDP growth rate. In the economy illustrated by the continuous line,
the employment rate is initially high and su¤ers a process of fast reduction. The high
employment rate explains the initially high level of per capita GDP, and the fast reduction
in employment explains the initially low growth rate of GDP.
The dashed line in Figure 1 illustrates the transitional dynamics of an economy that
has the same initial capital stock but an initially higher wage. The transitional dynamics
of this economy are the opposite of the ones obtained in the economy with initially low
wages. In particular, the growth rate of GDP decreases in the economy with initially high
wages, whereas it increases in the other economy. We then conclude that economies with
the same initial capital stock but di¤erent initial wages exhibit di¤erent time paths of
the GDP growth rate. Therefore, the initial cost of labor per e¢ ciency unit is relevant in
explaining convergence, and its inclusion in a growth regression may improve the t.15
In Figure 2, we compare two economies with the same initial conditions, but di¤erent
assumptions on wage inertia. In the economy characterized by the continuous line we
assume that  = 0:2; whereas the dashed line shows the time path of the variables when
there is no wage inertia, i.e.  ! 1. In both economies the initial stock of capital
per e¢ ciency units of labor is 50% smaller than its long run value and the initial wage
in the economy with wage inertia is set so that wages per e¢ ciency unit in the initial
period coincide in both economies.16 The main di¤erences are in the time paths of the
15Note that measuring the initial cost of labor per e¢ ciency units would require a measure of the level
of e¢ ciency units, which is not straightforward. To the best of our knowledge, the empirical growth
literature has not introduced this variable in growth regressions.
16In the economy with exible wages, the employment rate is xed and equal to its long run value and
wages are set in every period so that they are equal to the marginal product of labor. Therefore, in this
case, the initial wage is determined by the initial marginal product of labor which, in turn, depends on
the initial stock of capital. In the economy with wage inertia, wages depend on the past. In this case,
the employment rate is set so that the marginal product of labor equals wages. This implies that the
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employment rate (panel iv) and of the growth rate of GDP (panel v). In the economy
with exible wages, the employment rate is constant and the transition of the growth
rate is driven only by the diminishing returns to capital. In the economy with wage
inertia, capital increases faster than wages in the initial periods, implying an increase in
the employment rate. As a consequence, the reference wage increases, which accelerates
the process of wage growth. This implies that the employment rate eventually decreases
until it converges to its long run value. While the employment rate increases, the growth
rate of GDP is larger than that of the economy with exible wages, whereas it is smaller
when the employment rate decreases. This implies a fast and sharp transition of the
GDP growth rate in the economy with wage inertia. Note also that we can explain high
values of the GDP growth rates with plausible values of the interest rate and of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution that cannot be explained when wages are exible.
King and Rebelo (1993) argue that the neoclassical growth model with plausible values
of the interest rate cannot explain the large growth rates of East Asian economies during
the period 1960-2000. We show that the introduction of wage inertia in this neoclassical
growth model contributes to explaining the large GDP growth rate observed in emerging
economies.17
Figure 3 illustrates the transitional dynamics of two economies with di¤erent initial
conditions and di¤erent wage inertia. The continuous line shows the time path of the
variables of an economy with wage inertia ( = 0:08) ; an initial capital stock per e¢ ciency
unit that is 25% smaller than its long run value, and an initial wage per e¢ ciency unit
that is 10% higher than its long run value. The dashed line shows the time path of the
variables of an economy with exible wages and an initial capital stock per e¢ ciency unit
that is 25% smaller than its long run value. In the economy with exible wages, the
employment rate is constant and equal to its long run value. Given that the stock of
capital per e¢ ciency unit is initially low, the interest rate will be high. This initially high
interest rate causes a fast capital accumulation, which explains the increasing time path
of wages per e¢ ciency unit and the decreasing time path of the interest rate. The time
path of the interest rate explains the time path of the growth rate, which is initially high
and then, during the transition, decreases until it converges to its long run value. Thus,
the growth rate exhibits a monotonic transition.
The economy with wage inertia exhibits a completely di¤erent transition. The initially
employment is not constant. Wages are a state variable and their initial value does not depend on the
initial stock of capital. Therefore, the initial value of wages in the economy with wage inertia may not
coincide with the initial value of wages in the economy without wage inertia. Indeed, they only coincide
when the initial value of the employment rate in the economy with wage inertia coincides with its long
run value. This occurs in Figure 2, but does not occur in Figure 3.
17In Figure 2, the average growth rate during the rst 10 years is 4% when wages are exible and
6% when wages exhibit inertia. The latter growth rate is closer to the growth rates exhibited by some
emerging economies.
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high value of wages per e¢ ciency unit implies that the initial value of both the employment
rate and the interest rate are initially low. On the one hand, the low interest rate implies
that capital per e¢ ciency unit decreases in the initial periods. On the other hand, wages
decrease because of the low employment rate. The reduction in wages causes employment
to grow during the initial periods of the transition. In these initial periods, the growth
in employment is partially compensated by the reduction in capital per e¢ ciency unit,
and thus the growth rate of GDP is low. During the transition, when capital starts
accumulating and there is still employment growth, the GDP growth rate increases.
Finally, the process of employment and capital growth ends, which implies a decrease
in the growth rate of GDP. This explains the hump-shaped transition of the growth rate
of GDP.
Easterly (1991), Christiano (1989) and, more recently, Steger (2001), Papageorgiou
and Perez-Sebastian (2005) and Jeong and Yong Kim (2006, 2008) show that some fast
growing economies exhibit a hump-shaped transition of the GDP growth rate during the
development process. The neoclassical growth model with no wage inertia fails to show
this type of transition. In this paper, we show that a version of the neoclassical growth
model with wage inertia explains this non-monotonic transition as the result of labor
market dynamics. Obviously, the model in this paper is too simple to be a serious theory
of development. However, it suggests that labor market dynamics driven by wage inertia
may be a relevant part of a development theory.
4.2 Technological and scal policy shocks
In this subsection we compare the transitional dynamics implied by two di¤erent
technological shocks and a scal policy shock. In the gures, the continuous line illustrates
the transitional dynamics in our benchmark economy with wage inertia and the dashed
line shows the transitional dynamics of an economy with exible wages. In the examples
in this subsection we assume that the economies before the shock are initially in the steady
state.
Figure 4 shows the transitional dynamics implied by a permanent technological shock
that increases the level of TFP by 5%. In the economy with exible wages, this shock
causes an initial increase in the interest rate. This increase implies that the capital stock
per e¢ ciency units of labor, after the initial reduction due to the increase in the e¢ ciency
units, increases during the transition. This explains both the increasing time path of
wages per e¢ ciency unit and the decreasing time path of the interest rate. Note that the
time path of the interest rate explains both the initial increase in the GDP growth rate
and also the decreasing time path of this variable during the transition. The e¤ects of
this shock are completely di¤erent in the economy with wage inertia. In this economy, the
shock does not initially increase the wage. As a consequence, the wage per e¢ ciency units
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of labor initially su¤ers a stronger reduction. This has two e¤ects. First, the increase in
the interest rate will be larger when there is wage inertia, implying a faster accumulation
of capital. Second, the employment rate will initially jump upwards, as wages initially
remain constant and the marginal product of labor increases. As a consequence, the
average labor income of the economy increases. This causes the increase in wages per
e¢ ciency unit and the reduction in the employment rate during the transition. The
reduction of employment has a negative e¤ect on the growth rate of GDP. Thus, the
growth rate of GDP will be driven by two di¤erent and opposite e¤ects: the reduction
in the employment rate and the increase in the capital stock. Given our assumption of
low wage inertia, the employment rate will fall quickly, implying that this e¤ect initially
dominates the transition. This explains the reduction in the growth rate of GDP after
the positive technological shock. Note that the growth e¤ects of this technological shock
are the opposite of the ones obtained when wages do not exhibit inertia.18
Figure 5 shows the transitional dynamics implied by a permanent technological shock
that increases the exogenous growth rate from 2% to 3%. In the economy with exible
wages, the employment rate is constant and the transitional dynamics will be governed
only by the diminishing returns to capital. The growth rate increases along the transition
until it converges to its new long run value. As explained in Proposition 3, this shock
has permanent e¤ects on the employment rate in the economy with wage inertia, as a
consequence of the positive relationship between growth and employment introduced by
wage inertia. Therefore, the employment rate increases until it converges to its new steady
state. Obviously, this permanent e¤ect on employment also implies permanent e¤ects on
the levels of GDP and capital that are not present when wages are exible. As we said,
this result is consistent with the empirical nding of the long run relationship between
the rate of growth of total factor productivity and unemployment.
The purpose of presenting these two exercises is to show the relevant consequences of
assuming wage inertia in understanding the short and long run e¤ects of technological
shocks. As an illustrative example, consider the productivity slowdown su¤ered by most
western economies in the 1970s. If we interpret this slowdown as a permanent reduction
of the exogenous growth rate, then, according to the exible wage model, it will not have
long run e¤ects on the employment rate, whereas it will cause a permanent reduction in
the employment rate in an economy with wage inertia. This suggests that the di¤erent
long run e¤ects on the labor market that this shock had in the European and US economies
could be explained by a di¤erent intensity of wage inertia. Wages should exhibit strong
wage inertia in European economies, whereas they should be (almost) exible in the US.
Figure 6 shows the transitional dynamics implied by the introduction of an
18Danthine and Kurmann (2004) study the e¤ects of a temporary technological shock in a model with
wage inertia. Because of the di¤erences in price rigidity and the denition of the social norm, the implied
transitional dynamics are very di¤erent from the ones obtained in this paper.
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unemployment benet,  = 1=3. This scal policy raises the current average labor income
and thus increases wages. In the economy with exible wages, this causes an initial jump
upwards in wages per e¢ ciency unit which has two di¤erent e¤ects. On the one hand,
the employment rate decreases, which implies a reduction in GDP. On the other hand,
the interest rate decreases which causes the reduction of capital per e¢ ciency units of
labor during the transition. The reduction in the capital stock explains the lower growth
rate during the transition. In the economy with wage inertia, wages do not jump after
the introduction of the unemployment benet. As a consequence, the interest rate does
not initially decrease, nor does the employment rate. This implies that the level of GDP
remains constant after the introduction of the unemployment benet. However, during
the initial periods of the transition, wages will experience a process of rapid growth that
reduces both the interest rate and the employment rate. As a consequence, the stock
of capital decreases during the transition. The combined e¤ect of the reduction in the
stock of capital per e¢ ciency units of labor and in the employment rate explains the larger
reduction in the growth rate and the time path of the log of per capita GDP. This example
shows that wage inertia delays the e¤ects of this scal policy, and the reduction in the
GDP growth due to this scal policy will be larger. We conjecture that this conclusion
could be generalized to any scal policy that a¤ects the economy by increasing wages.
5 Internal reference wage
We have assumed that workersdisutility of e¤ort depends on the comparison between
the wage and an external reference wage, which is interpreted as a social norm. In this
section, we will assume instead that the disutility of e¤ort depends on the comparison
between the wage and an internal reference wage which, according to Collard and de la
Croix (2000), can be interpreted as a personal norm. We dene this personal norm as wpt
and we assume that it depends on the past workers labor income, as follows:
wpt = w
p
0e
  t + 
Z t
0
e (t i)Ip (i) di; (25)
where wp0 is the initial value of the personal norm,  > 0 provides a measure of the wage
adjustment rate and Ipt is the workers labor income
Ipt = (1  ) ltwt + (1  lt) bt; (26)
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where wt is the wage of the worker.19 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there
are no unemployment benets, i.e. bt = 0: Di¤erentiating with respect to time (25), we
obtain the following di¤erential equations governing the evolution of the personal norm:
_wpt =  [(1  ) ltwt   wpt ] : (27)
Firms choose capital, labor and wages to maximize the discounted sum of prots
subject to technology, the e¤ort function, and equation (27). The latter equation implies
that rms take into account that setting current wages today a¤ects the future value of
the personal norm. In contrast, this is not taken into account in the external reference
wage model, as the social norm depends on the average wage of the economy and not
on the workers wage. This important di¤erence means that in the internal reference
wage model the rmsproblem is a dynamic maximization problem. The maximization
problem is solved in Appendix C. We show that e¤ort is not constant in this case and
that it satises the following di¤erential equation:
_eft
eft
= kt
 bwt
1  
  1
 e expeft  
"
   n+ 
 bwt
1  
 1

#
1  eft

; (28)
where bwt = wt.Ateft is the ratio between wages and e¢ ciency units of labor. In Appendix
C we also show that the dynamic equation driving wages per e¢ ciency unit of labor is
bwtbwt =
"
   n+ 
 bwt
1  
 1

#
1  eft
2
+ eft e expeft  kt bwt1  
  1

     x (29)
The system of di¤erential equations (15), (16), (28), and (29) characterizes the
dynamic equilibrium. The equilibrium is characterized by two state variables (kt and bwt)
and two control variables

ct and e
f
t

. The steady state values of the two state variables
and consumption coincide with the steady state of those variables in the economy with
an external reference wage; the long run level of e¤ort is
ef

= 1   + x
   n+  + + x < 1
and the long run employment rate is
l =
 + x
e exp (ef) =

 + x


exp
 
1  ef ;
19If the worker is employed he obtains Iet = (1  )wt   mt and if he is unemployed obtains
Iut = bt +
mt
1 lt  mt; where mt is the cost of the unemployment insurance. Complete insurance implies
that mt = (1  lt) ((1  )wt   bt) and then Iet = Iut = Ipt = (1  ) wtlt +(1  lt) bt where wt is the
wage of the worker.
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where  = e exp (1) : From the comparison with the economy with an external reference
wage it follows that the long run level of e¤ort is smaller, while the long run employment
rate is higher.20 This is a consequence of the fact that in the internal reference wage
model rms set lower wages in order to reduce the future value of the reference wage.21
This explains the larger employment rate and the lower e¤ort level.
From the numerical comparison between the external and internal reference wage
economies, we show that the time paths of the variables in both models are almost
identical, with the notable exception of the GDP growth rate.22 The reason is that
this variable depends directly on the time path of e¤ort, which is not constant in the
internal reference wage model. To see this, note that using the production function we
obtain that the logarithm of per capita GDP is
lnGDP = a+  ln k + (1  ) ln l + (1  ) e+ xt;
where a is a constant. Note that the time path of the GDP growth rate depends on
the time path of e¤ort during the transition. Thus, the non-constant time path of e¤ort
in the internal reference wage model directly a¤ects the time path of the GDP growth
rate: an increasing (decreasing) time path of e¤ort increases (decreases) the GDP growth
rate, which will be higher (lower) than the one obtained in the external reference wage
model. As an example of this, Figure 7 compares the time path of several variables in the
economy with an internal reference wage (continuous line) and with an external reference
wage (dashed line). We assume the same parameter values than in Figure 1, the initial
capital stock and the initial wage are 5% smaller than their long run value. The time
path of all the variables is very similar except for the time paths of e¤ort and of the
GDP growth rate. The increasing time path of e¤ort in the internal reference wage model
implies that the GDP growth rate will be initially larger than the GDP growth rate in
the external reference wage model. However, the transition of the GDP growth rate is
from below in both cases and opposite to the transition in the model with exible wages,
which is from above as capital increases during the transition. We conclude that in both
cases transitional dynamics depend on the initial value of wages and thus may be very
di¤erent from the ones obtained in the model with exible wages. This conclusion is also
illustrated in Figure 8, where we compare the internal and external reference wage models
considering the numerical example of Figure 3. In this example, e¤ort is declining in the
20To make the comparison, note that the long run employment rate in the external reference wage
economy equals l = ( + x) / when  = 0:
21The long run value of wages per e¢ ciency unit of labor coincides in both economies; i.e. wi

Aef

=
we /A where wi is the wage level in the internal reference economy and we is the wage level in the external
reference economy. As ef

< 1; it follows that wi < we:
22To simplify the comparison, we assume that  = e exp (1) in the external reference wage model and
 = e exp  ef in the internal reference wage economy. Using this di¤erent parametrization, the long
run values of the variables coincide in both models with the exception of e¤ort.
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internal reference wage model, which implies that the GDP growth rate in this case is
initially lower than in the external reference wage model. However, the time path of the
GDP growth rate is still hump-shaped in the internal reference wage case. Therefore, the
main conclusions regarding the e¤ects of wage inertia on the transitional dynamics of the
GDP growth rate hold when the reference wage is internal instead of external.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we develop a version of the neoclassical growth model with wage inertia.
We use this model to compare the equilibrium with wage inertia with the equilibrium
of an economy with exible wages. We show that these economies exhibit very di¤erent
transitional dynamics.
We study the transitional dynamics using selected numerical exercises. In the rst
exercise, we show that economies with the same initial capital stock may exhibit opposite
transitions of the GDP growth rates because of di¤erent values of the initial wage. In
the second and third exercises, we compare the transitional dynamics in an economy with
wage inertia and in an economy with exible wages. In the economy with exible wages,
the time path of the macroeconomic variables exhibits a monotonic behavior, while we
show that this time path can be non-monotonic when wage inertia is introduced. We
argue that this non-monotonic transition is a consequence of the interaction between two
forces: diminishing returns to capital and the process of wage adjustment. We show that
this non-monotonic transition may explain both the initially high growth rates and also
the hump-shaped transitions of the GDP growth rate that some emerging economies have
exhibited in recent decades. This suggests that a closer analysis of labor market dynamics
when wages exhibit inertia could explain some facts of the development process.
In the following two exercises we study the transitional dynamics implied by two
di¤erent technological shocks: a permanent increase in the level of TFP and a permanent
increase in the TFP growth rate. We show that the e¤ects of the rst shock on the
growth rate of GDP will be the opposite if wage inertia is introduced. We also show that
the second shock only has permanent e¤ects on employment and on the level of GDP
when wages exhibit inertia. We conclude that wage inertia crucially changes the e¤ects
of technological shocks. Finally, in a last numerical exercise, we show that the e¤ects of
scal policy depend on the intensity of wage inertia.
The introduction of wage inertia does not modify the long run GDP growth rate
because it is exogenous in this model. The aim of future research is to extend this analysis
of wage inertia to endogenous growth models. In these models, the long run growth rate
of GDP is endogenously determined by the fundamentals of the economy and therefore it
may depend on the intensity of wage inertia.
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A System of Di¤erential equations
Using (23) and (24), we obtain that  (ctAt) = ; ~k( bwt) = ( bwt /(1  )) 1 ; f 0 h~k ( bwt)i =
 ( bwt /(1  )) 1 ; lt = kt ( bwt /(1  ))  1 ; and h h~k ( bwt)i = ( bwt /(1  )) 1 :
Therefore, the system of di¤erential equations characterizing the equilibrium with wage
inertia, (15), (16), and (22), simplies as follows:
_ct
ct
=

  bwt
1 
 1
        x

, (A1)
_kt
kt
=
 bwt
1  
 1

  ct
kt
  (n+ x+ ) ; (A2)
and bwtbwt = 
 
 (1  ) kt
 bwt
1  
  1

+   1
!
  x: (A3)
If wages are exible then lt = l. In this case, from (13), we obtain that the wage
is the following function of capital: bwt = (1  )  kt/ l : Note that this implies that
capital is the only state variable and the system of di¤erential equations characterizing
the equilibrium, (15) and (16), simplify as follows:
_ct
ct
=


kt
l
 1
       x

, (A4)
and
_kt
kt
=

kt
l
 1
  ct
kt
  (n+ x+ ) : (A5)
B Proof of Proposition 4
The Jacobian matrix associated to (A1), (A2) and (A3) is
J =
0B@
@ _wt
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@ _wt
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The characteristic polynomial is
P (J) =  3 + 2Tr (J) + H +Det (J) ;
where Tr (J) is the trace of the Jacobian matrix, the determinant is
Det (J) =  (1  )

w
1  
  2

wc > 0;
and
H =
@ _kt
@wt
@ _wt
@kt
  @ _wt
@wt
@ _kt
@kt
=
=  (1  ) 

k


w
1  
 1

[+ (   1)x  n] > 0;
where the inequality follows from the bounded utility condition. Given that H > 0 and
Det (J) > 0, the equilibrium is saddle path stable regardless of the sign of the trace.
C Internal reference wage
When the reference wage is based on a personal norm, the prot maximization problem
of the rms is
Max
Z 1
0
exp ( R (t))
n
F (Kt; e
f
t (wt; w
p
t )AtLt)  rtKt   wtLt
o
dt
s:t:
_wpt =  [(1  ) ltwt   wpt ] (C1)
where R (t) =
R t
=0
r () d and
eft (wt; w
p
t ) = ln [(1  )wt]  ln (ewpt ) : (C2)
The Hamiltonian is
H = exp ( R (t))
n
F (Kt; e
f
t (wt; w
p
t )AtLt)  rtKt   wtLt
o
+ t [(1  ) ltwt   wpt ]
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and the rst order conditions with respect to capital, labor, wages and the reference wage
are
rt = F1 (C3)
wt = e
f
tAtF2 (C4)
exp ( R (t))

F2AtLt
wt
  Lt

+ t (1  ) lt = 0 (C5)
exp ( R (t)) F2AtLt
wpt
+ t = _t (C6)
Combining (C4) and (C5), we obtain
1  1
eft
= t
 (1  ) lt
Lt
exp (R (t)) ; (C7)
We log-di¤erentiate with respect to time (C7) to obtain
  _e
f
t
eft

1  eft
 = _t
t
  n+ r (t) : (C8)
From combining (C4), (C5), (C6), and (C2) we obtain
lte expeft  1
eft   1

+  =
_t
t
: (C9)
We combine (C8) and (C9) to obtain
  _e
f
t
eft
= [   n+ r (t)]

1  eft

  lte expeft  : (C10)
From (C2), we also obtain that
_wt
wt
= _eft +
_wpt
wpt
; (C11)
where the growth rate of wpt is obtained from combining (C1) and (C2)
_wpt
wpt
= 
h
lte expeft   1i : (C12)
We dene wages per e¢ ciency unit of labor and capital per e¢ ciency unit of labor
taking into account e¤ort, i.e. bwt = wt.Ateft and bkt = Kt.AteftLt : Then, from (C4)
and (24), we obtain that ~k( bwt) = ( bwt /(1  )) 1 and the equations driving the growth
of consumption per e¢ ciency unit of labor (c = C /A) and capital per e¢ ciency unit of
labor (k = K /AN ) are (A1) and (A2). We log-di¤erentiate the denition of bwt and we
30
use (C11), (C10) and (C12) to obtain
bwtbwt = eft lte exp

eft

   + [   n+ r (t)]

1  eft
2
  x: (C13)
where r (t) =  ( bwt /(1  )) 1 and lt = kt.bkt = kt ( bwt /(1  ))  1 : We substitute
these expressions in equations (C10) and (C13) to obtain (28) and (29).
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Figures 
 
        Figure 1. Transitional dynamics: different initial conditions 
 
Note. Continuous lines display the transition when k0=0.95k*and 
*
0 ˆ95.0ˆ ww  . Dashed lines display 
the transition when k0=0.95k*and 
*
0 ˆ05.1ˆ ww  . 
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             Figure 2. Transitional dynamics: different wage inertia 
 
 
Note. Continuous lines display the transition of an economy with wage inertia andk0=0.5k*. Dashed 
lines display the transition of an economy with flexible wages and k0=0.5k*. 
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           Figure 3. Transitional dynamics: different wage inertia and initial conditions 
 
Note. Continuous lines display the transition of an economy with wage inertia,k0=0.75k* and 
*
0 ˆ1.1ˆ ww  . Dashed lines display the transition of an economy with flexible wages and k0=0.75k*. 
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 Figure 4. Permanent increase in the level of TFP 
 
Note. Both lines display the transition implied by a permanent 5% increase in the level of TFP. 
Continuous (dashed) lines show the transition of an economy with wage inertia (flexible wages). 
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Figure 5. Permanent increase in the long run growth rate 
 
Note. Both lines display the transition implied by a permanent increase in the growth rate of TFP. 
Continuous (dashed) lines show the transition of an economy with wage inertia (flexible wages). 
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Figure 6. Unemployment benefit 
Note. Both lines display the transition implied by the introduction of an unemployment benefit 
(λ=1/3). Continuous (dashed) lines show the transition of an economy with wage inertia (flexible 
wages). 
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      Figure 7. Comparison personal and social norm. Transitional Dynamics I 
 
Note. Both lines display the transition of economies with wage inertia and the following initial 
conditions: k0=0.95k*and 
*
0 ˆ95.0ˆ ww  . Continuous (dashed) lines show the transition of an economy 
with an internal (external) reference wage. 
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     Figure 8. Comparison personal and social norm. Transitional Dynamics II 
Note. Both lines display the transition of economies with wage inertia and the following initial 
conditions: k0=0.75k*and 
*
0 ˆ1.1ˆ ww  . Continuous (dashed) lines show the transition of an economy 
with an internal (external) reference wage. 
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